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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 269 
Accident time: 10:20 Accident Date: 05/06/2000 
Where it occurred: Petrol refinery, Prizren 
district. MNB(S) 
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 12/06/2000 
ID original source: KC/MD/JF Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Fuze Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 15/03/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 47° 21' 88" Latitude: 46° 83' 09" 
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: KFOR Misc Map series: UTM/WGS 84 
Map edition: 8 Map sheet: 19 & 20 
Map name: 1:50,000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
 
Accident report 
A Mine Accident Report was prepared for the country MACC and made available in August 
2000. The following summarises its content.  
The victim has nine months experience working as a Battle Area Clearance team member. 
The deminers were working at a petrol refinery that had been "a NATO target during the 
bombing campaign" and "cluster strikes" had been recorded. "Other clearance agencies and 
KFOR [had] previously conducted clearance and demolition on [the] site". The weather on the 
1 
day was clear and sunny with the temperature above 25 degrees C. The site was last visited 
by MACC QA five days before the accident. 
The communications system in place was not working well on the day of the accident. As a 
result the demining group's HQ was not told of the accident for seven hours and the MACC 
was not informed until the following day. 
At 10:20 The victim was using a "Schonstedt GA 72-cd Locator in his "clearance area" and 
got a signal. He moved the grass from the area and "noticed a silver coloured metallic object 
visible on the surface". He was moving a stone to investigate this "suspected part of a BLU 
97" when at 10:20 it detonated. He suffered injury to the index finger of his right hand. He was 
wearing his PPE according to SOPs. [The PPE was not described or photographed but would 
have included a visor and flak-jacket as required in that theatre.]  
Work at the site was halted. The site medic gave first aid within three minutes of the accident. 
The victim walked from the accident site. Despite the apparently minor nature of the injury, 
the Team Leader decided that the victim should be checked in hospital. The victim was 
"stabilised" and taken to the Argentine KFOR hospital, arriving 40 minutes after the accident.  
On arrival at the hospital the victim's hand was x-rayed. It was decided that there were no 
fractures and that no stitches were needed. "His cut was cleaned and dressed", antibiotics 
were prescribed and he was told to return two days later to the outpatients’ department to 
have it checked. 
The investigators decided that the device involved was "most likely the detonator from a BLU-
97 previously destroyed". 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that if the victim had more experience he might have been more 
cautious "before removing stones", but that the accident was unavoidable. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the demining group carry out a CASEVAC exercise and 
that the MACC should be informed of all accidents no matter how minor within two hours (as 
required in the MACC Technical Standards). 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 343 Name: Name removed 
Age: 19 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 40 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Hand 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
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Medical report 
This unsigned report is based on the statements of the Medic, BAC Searchers and the Victim. 
At the time of the accident,(approx. 10.20)  There were one fully equipped ambulance with a 
driver and one Medic at the resting area. 
When they heard the explosion and the whistles they immediately went to the place of the 
accident. 
They arrived at the place of the accident in 2 minutes. The victim was standing up in safe 
area and had already been taken care of by [a deminer] who is also a medic. 
The victim had sustained a laceration to his right forefinger, about 3cm long, and he was 
bleeding, this was only a minor injury and he was feeling OK. 
The medic examined him and no other injury was found. 
The finger was cleaned and bandaged and the victim was placed in the ambulance. 
After contacting the [demining group] office in Gjakova, the victim was transported to KFOR 
hospital in Gjakova where he arrived at 10.50 
At the hospital he was examined, x-rayed and his wound cleaned and dressed. No other 
treatment was required and there was no need to stay at the hospital. 
The medic filled in the Emergency journal and they all went to the [demining group] office for 
debriefing. 
 
Conclusions 
The medical treatment was accurate according to the type of injury. 
From the time of the accident till the time of arrival at the hospital was only 30 minutes. 
The CASEVAC was performed to SOPs  
 
Analysis 
This accident could be classed as a “Missed-mine accident” because the area had been 
cleared before and it seems likely that the device involved had been thrown out of a previous 
(inadequate) detonation. The poor quality of the previous clearance had been recognised, 
which explains why it was being cleared again. However, given that the area was being 
recleared and the accident occurred during excavation, it is classed as an “Excavation 
accident”. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because it seems that the victim 
was working as directed when the accident occurred. His failure to recognise the device that 
he picked up leads to the secondary cause being listed as “Inadequate training”. This failing 
was recognised by the demining group management – see Related papers. 
The fact that the area had been cleared at least once previously lends weight to the view that 
the device involved was a remnant of a previous incomplete destruction. But whether the part 
was from a BLU-97 is not at all clear.  
The accident report demonstrates an unusually thorough and critical approach to accident 
investigation. The Mine Action Co-ordination Centre that carried out the investigation was not 
engaged in demining, and this may (in part) explain the unusually objective nature of their 
investigations. 
 
Related papers 
An investigation report by the Operations Manager of the demining group recorded that 
communications between himself and the accident site were successful and that he was 
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informed of the accident at 10:35 on the day it occurred. His attempt to "stand down" his 
operatives was complicated by an inability to contact them all, and his inability to reach his 
group's HQ meant that they were not informed until 17:15. 
The Operations Manager and Team Leader examined the accident site and could find no 
evidence of "disturbed ground" or any parts of the device. This was taken as evidence that 
the device was a "kick-out" from a previous demolition at the site. The victim's PPE was intact 
with no evidence of fragment impact or damage. 
The operations Manager decided to increase training on component parts of sub-munitions. 
He explained that the "broken" communications meant that he did not want to risk being 
misunderstood and provoking unnecessary activity by trying to report the minor accident 
sooner.  
 
4 
